Justices hear a dispute over Trump administration rules to limit contraception requirements. Hospitalized Ruth Bader Ginsburg calls in.
Many can now meet payroll for a few weeks – but then what?
Eric Hofmann told San Luis Obispo officials he would bus in "hundreds and hundreds of pissed off people potentially adding to this pandemic."
A small oil town in Southern California is pummeled by the economy during the coronavirus outbreak and economic downturn
About 1,900 Airbnb employees will be affected by the layoffs, CEO Brian Chesky said.
Trump again demands a payroll tax cut, but it makes no sense.
The airline received criticism to ask fliers can pay to social distance on their next flight
There's been talk of creating immunity passports for workers using coronavirus antibody tests, but they're in short supply and not 100% accurate.
Workers crammed virtually shoulder-to-shoulder to tend production lines moving at inexorable speeds, high rates of disease and injury, low pay and unforgiving rules on time off or meal and bathroom breaks. Descriptions of today's meatpacking industry sound lifted from Upton Sinclair.
A SoCal woman found an "adverse report" on her credit file. Then she discovered the entire department that can help fix the problem is furloughed.
Amid a public health crisis, trust in governments is rising, while trust in businesses, and in particular, CEOs has fallen sharply, a report says.
Hoping to get Americans traveling again, a travel trade group has developed cleaning protocols and other steps to protect people.
California on Monday sued two gasoline trading firms, alleging they took advantage of a 2015 refinery explosion in Torrance to improperly drive up the price at the pump.
Travel has changed since the global pandemic began its trip around the world. Here are things that can help you navigate these difficult times and plan for the future.
In the coronavirus shutdown, people turn to GoFundMe to ask strangers for the basics: money for food and rent to survive
A catch in the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program could disqualify many workers.
The coronavirus shutdowns have led to devastating losses in advertising revenue to newspapers, including the L.A. Times.
To slow the spread of the novel coronavirus, passengers soon will be required to wear masks by the largest airlines in the U.S.
By removing unemployment benefits, states are forcing workers to risk their lives
Mexican officials have begun to cave, despite warnings from health authorities
Cedars-Sinai is embroiled in a political battle over Trump's remarks on a potential virus treatment.
The COVID-19 pandemic is unleashing a wave of labor unrest harnessing front-line workers' fear and anger across California and the nation.
Problems from the surge of jobless claims reflect years of cutbacks and greater restrictions on eligibility.
Mortgage companies are letting home owners with coronavirus-related financial hardships delay payments, but the process is confusing
Charlie Plowman, who started the La Cañada Outlook in 1998, will acquire the three community news titles.
Job seeking in an uncertain economy is difficult enough. Throw in fears of contracting the coronavirus, home quarantines and hiring freezes, and the hunt becomes harder.
Laura Howe repurposed fabric from her Matrushka Construction boutique to make masks for the coronavirus outbreak. She's sold 8,000.
Jeff Shell, whose 'Trolls World Tour' comments upset theater owners, reaffirms that digital releases will be part of Universal Pictures' new reality.
Cruise lines are tightening health protocols that determine who can and can't sail.
Marc Ching, a prominent Southern California animal rights advocate, has agreed to stop pitching an herbal supplement as a remedy for COVID-19.
Millions of homeowners have signed up for mortgage forbearance programs. But there is confusion and concern over how they will pay back what they owe.
In all, the state received some 3 million surgical masks made by BYD, a company known for building electric vehicles with an assembly plant in Los Angeles County.
With storefronts closed, supply chains in disarray and the global economy in peril, money laundering schemes are hobbled and cash is piling up in L.A., the city's top drug enforcement official said.
Disneyland is closed -- but that hasn't stopped fans from building their own theme park rides and attractions in their homes and backyards.
Some solar workers have been ordered down from rooftops after neighbors called the police, solar industry officials say.
Scientists are using the coronavirus to study the contagion of misinformation
Your next flight probably won't be much like your last one. It may cost more, it may be emptier, it may include a 'sky janitor.' And forget snacks.
The sprawling shopping center has lost its anchor tenants, Walmart and Sears. A remake will add offices but not the housing that had previously been approved.
From Cal/OSHA complaints to uniting with unions, workers can take some action if they feel their workplaces aren't keeping them safe during the coronavirus pandemic.
Shelter in place orders (SIPOs) require residents to remain home for all but essential activities such as purchasing food or medicine, caring for others, exercise, or traveling for employment deemed essential. Between March 19 and April 20, 2020, 40 states and the District of Columbia adopted SIPOs. This study explores the impact of SIPOs on health, with particular attention to heterogeneity in their impacts. First, using daily state-level social distancing data from SafeGraph and a difference-in-differences approach, we document that adoption of a SIPO was associated with a 5 to 10 percent increase in the rate at which state residents remained in their homes full-time. Then, using daily state-level coronavirus case data collected by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, we find that approximately three weeks following the adoption of a SIPO, cumulative COVID-19 cases fell by 44 percent. Event-study analyses confirm common COVID-19 case trends in the week prior to SIPO adoption and show that SIPO-induced case reductions grew larger over time. However, this average effect masks important heterogeneity across states — early adopters and high population density states appear to reap larger benefits from their SIPOs. Finally, we find that statewide SIPOs were associated with a reduction in coronavirus-related deaths, but estimated mortality effects were imprecisely estimated.
We develop a model of financial crises with both a financial amplification mechanism, via frictional intermediation, and a role for sentiment, via time-varying beliefs about an illiquidity state. We confront the model with data on credit spreads, equity prices, credit, and output across the financial crisis cycle. In particular, we ask the model to match data on the frothy pre-crisis behavior of asset markets and credit, the sharp transition to a crisis where asset values fall, disintermediation occurs and output falls, and the post-crisis period characterized by a slow recovery in output. We find that a pure amplification mechanism quantitatively matches the crisis and aftermath period but fails to match the pre-crisis evidence. Mixing sentiment and amplification allows the model to additionally match the pre-crisis evidence. We consider two versions of sentiment, a Bayesian belief updating process and one that overweighs recent observations. We find that both models match the crisis patterns qualitatively, generating froth pre-crisis, non-linear behavior in the crisis, and slow recovery. The non-Bayesian model improves quantitatively on the Bayesian model in matching the extent of the pre-crisis froth.
We propose a novel measure of bond market liquidity that does not depend on transaction data: the strength of the cross-sectional relationship between mutual fund cash holdings and fund flow volatility. Our measure captures how liquid funds perceive their portfolio holdings to be at a given point in time. The perceived liquidity of speculative grade and Rule 144A bonds is significantly lower than investment grade bonds in the cross section and deteriorated significantly following the 2008-9 financial crisis. Our measure can be applied in settings where either transaction data are not available or transactions are rare, including the markets for asset-backed securities, syndicated loans, and municipal bonds.
In response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the US government brought about a collection of fiscal stimulus measures: the 2020 CARES Act. Among other provisions, this Act directed cash payments to households. We analyze households’ spending responses using high-frequency transaction data. We also explore heterogeneity by income levels, recent income declines, and liquidity. We find that households respond rapidly to receipt of stimulus payments, with spending increasing by $0.25-$0.35 per dollar of stimulus during the first 10 days. Households with lower incomes, greater income drops, and lower levels of liquidity display stronger responses. Liquidity plays the most important role, with no observed spending response for households with high levels of bank account balances. Relative to the effects of previous economic stimulus programs in 2001 and 2008, we see much smaller increases in durables spending and larger increases in spending on food, likely reflecting the impact of shelter-in-place orders and supply disruptions. We hope that our results inform the current debate about appropriate policy measures.
We model optimal e-cigarette regulation and estimate key sufficient statistics. Using tax changes and scanner data, we estimate relatively elastic demand and limited substitution between e-cigarettes and combustible cigarettes. In sample surveys, historical smoking declines for high- and low-vaping demographics were unchanged after e-cigarettes were introduced; this demographic shift-share identification also suggests limited substitution. We field a new survey of experts, who report that vaping is almost as harmful as smoking cigarettes. In our model, these results imply that current e-cigarette taxes are far below the social optimum, but Monte Carlo simulations highlight substantial uncertainty.
We show a causal impact of immigration on innovation and dynamism in US counties. To identify the causal impact of immigration, we use 130 years of detailed data on migrations from foreign countries to US counties to isolate quasi-random variation in the ancestry composition of US counties that results purely from the interaction of two historical forces: (i) changes over time in the relative attractiveness of different destinations within the US to the average migrant arriving at the time and (ii) the staggered timing of the arrival of migrants from different origin countries. We then use this plausibly exogenous variation in ancestry composition to predict the total number of migrants flowing into each US county in recent decades. We show four main results. First, immigration has a positive impact on innovation, measured by the patenting of local firms. Second, immigration has a positive impact on measures of local economic dynamism. Third, the positive impact of immigration on innovation percolates over space, but spatial spillovers quickly die out with distance. Fourth, the impact of immigration on innovation is stronger for more educated migrants.
The lack of reliable electricity in the developing world is widely viewed by policymakers as a major constraint on firm productivity. Yet most empirical studies find modest short-run effects of power outages on firm performance. This paper builds a dynamic macroeconomic model to study the long-run general equilibrium effects of power outages on productivity. The model captures the key features of how firms acquire electricity in the developing world, in particular the rationing of grid electricity and the possibility of self-generated electricity at higher cost. Power outages lower productivity in the model by creating idle resources, by depressing the scale of incumbent firms and by reducing entry of new firms. Consistent with the empirical literature, the model predicts that the short-run partial-equilibrium effects of eliminating outages are small. However, the long-run general-equilibrium effects are many times larger, supporting the view that eliminating outages is an important development objective.
What are the characteristics of workers in jobs likely to be initially affected by broad social distancing and later by narrower policy tailored to jobs with low risk of disease transmission? We use O NET to construct a measure of the likelihood that jobs can be conducted from home (a variant of Dingel and Neiman, 2020) and a measure of low physical proximity to others at work. We validate the measures by showing how they relate to similar measures constructed using time use data from ATUS. Our main finding is that workers in low-work-from-home or high-physical- proximity jobs are more economically vulnerable across various measures constructed from the CPS and PSID: they are less educated, of lower income, have fewer liquid assets relative to income, and are more likely renters. We further substantiate the measures with behavior during the epidemic. First, we show that MSAs with less pre-virus employment in work-from-home jobs experienced smaller declines in the incidence of `staying-at-home', as measured using SafeGraph cell phone data. Second, we show that both occupations and types of workers predicted to be employed in low work-from-home jobs experienced greater declines in employment according to the March 2020 CPS. For example, non-college educated workers experienced a 4ppt larger decline in employment relative to those with a college degree.
We construct a quantitative model of an economy hit by an epidemic. People differ by age and skill, and choose occupations and whether to commute to work or work from home, to maximize their income and minimize their fear of infection. Occupations differ by wage, infection risk, and the productivity loss when working from home. By setting the model parameters to replicate the progression of COVID-19 in South Korea and the United Kingdom, we obtain three key results. First, government-imposed lock-downs may not present a clear trade-off between GDP and public health, as commonly believed, even though its immediate effect is to reduce GDP and infections by forcing people to work from home. A premature lifting of the lock-down raises GDP temporarily, but infections rise over the next months to a level at which many people choose to work from home, where they are less productive, driven by the fear of infection. A longer lock-down eventually mitigates the GDP loss as well as flattens the infection curve. Second, if the UK had adopted South Korean policies, its GDP loss and infections would have been substantially smaller both in the short and the long run. This is not because Korea implemented policies sooner, but because aggressive testing and tracking more effectively reduce infections and disrupt the economy less than a blanket lock-down. Finally, low-skill workers and self-employed lose the most from the epidemic and also from the government policies. However, the policy of issuing “visas” to those who have antibodies will disproportionately benefit the low-skilled, by relieving them of the fear of infection and also by allowing them to get back to work.
We develop a multi-risk SIR model (MR-SIR) where infection, hospitalization and fatality rates vary between groups—in particular between the “young”, “the middle-aged” and the “old”. Our MR-SIR model enables a tractable quantitative analysis of optimal policy similar to those already developed in the context of the homogeneous-agent SIR models. For baseline parameter values for the COVID-19 pandemic applied to the US, we find that optimal policies differentially targeting risk/age groups significantly outperform optimal uniform policies and most of the gains can be realized by having stricter lockdown policies on the oldest group. For example, for the same economic cost (24.3% decline in GDP), optimal semi–targeted or fully-targeted policies reduce mortality from 1.83% to 0.71% (thus, saving 2.7 million lives) relative to optimal uniform policies. Intuitively, a strict and long lockdown for the most vulnerable group both reduces infections and enables less strict lockdowns for the lower-risk groups. We also study the impacts of social distancing, the matching technology, the expected arrival time of a vaccine, and testing with or without tracing on optimal policies. Overall, targeted policies that are combined with measures that reduce interactions between groups and increase testing and isolation of the infected can minimize both economic losses and deaths in our model.
Emergency department visits are costly to providers and to patients. We use the Flint water crisis to test if an increase in office visits reduced avoidable emergency room visits. In September 2015, the city of Flint issued a lead advisory to its residents, alerting them of increased lead levels in their drinking water, resulting from the switch in water source from Lake Huron to the Flint River. Using Medicaid claims for 2013-2016, we find that this information shock increased the share of enrollees who had lead tests performed by 1.7 percentage points. Additionally, it increased office visits immediately following the information shock and led to a reduction of 4.9 preventable, non-emergent, and primary-care-treatable emergency room visits per 1000 eligible children (8.2%). This decrease is present in shifts from emergency room visits to office visits across several common conditions. Our analysis suggest that children were more likely to receive care from the same clinic following lead tests and that establishing care reduced the likelihood parents would take their children to emergency rooms for conditions treatable in an office setting. Our results are potentially applicable to any situation in which individuals are induced to seek more care in an office visit setting.